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 Abstract 
This project investigates the link between memory studies and radical right populist party             
studies. It argues that the governments of Germany and Italy portray a certain image of the                
Second World war in the present, which affects the social acceptability of ideas associated              
with radical right populist parties, thereby influencing their political success. The main            
expectation is that a less penitent memory of the Second World war increases the social               
acceptability of these ideas. The projects uses a mixed-methods approach that summarises            
and contrasts qualitative data from the academic literature, political speeches and opinion            
polls. It finds that Germany and Italy differ in the memory of their war experience. Moreover,                
it finds that this approach continues in mainstream narratives today and influences public             
opinion in line with the theory.  
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 “Germany’s young people have great expectations of Europe  
because they remember their country’s history.” 
-Macron, 2018 
I/ Introduction 
The rise of Radical Right Populist Parties (RRPPs) has been argued to be the most dramatic                
development in recent European politics (Art, 2006). From the 2002 election in France where              
the far right party Front National unexpectedly reached the second round of the presidential              
elections, the populist parties have been dividing our societies politically. Given the impact of              
these parties, political scientists have been studying the variations in popularity and by             
extension, the chances of electoral success in different countries (Mudde, 2013, 2016).            
Particularly, the importance of sociological and historical (institutionalist) explanations has          
been emphasised (Mudde, 2007). However the field of memory studies, which deals with the              
representation of history in the present, has been largely ignored as a potential source of               
explanations. Scholars from this field argue that historical narratives generate normative and            
causal claims about certain topics in politics (Booth, 1999; Art, 2006; Lebow, 2006). From              
this perspective, memory is less concerned about historical accuracy and more about the             
political values and ideas that arise from a certain interpretation of the past. Given the               
resurgence of certain extremist ideas within some RRPPs that mirror popular discourses            
before and during the Second World War, I will look at the memory of the war and the                  
possible influences it exerts over the present acceptability of those ideas. This research is              
guided by the following question: 
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 To what extent and in what way(s) does the manner in which the Second World War is 
remembered in countries influence the social acceptability of ideas linked to radical 
right-wing populist parties? 
 
I argue that governments portray a certain image of the Second World war in the present                
which affects the social acceptability of ideas that RRPPs try to appeal to, thereby influencing               
their political success. I differentiate the type of memory based on the extent to which the                
narrative portrays the country as having resisted the oppressor and the recognition of a              
(negative) role of the country or an admittance of guilt. I will first review the literature on the                  
rise of RRPPs and memory studies to identify a gap in the understanding of the cultural                
context in which RRPPs operate. I argue that memory studies helps us address this gap. After                
the literature review, I develop my theoretical argument. This is followed by a section              
covering research design. Herein I talk about the case-selection, operationalisation and           
data-selection. I analyse academic work, political elite speeches and opinion polls in order to              
answer my research question. The final section concludes and discusses the implications of             
this thesis on future research.  
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 II/ Literature Review and Relevance  
This section provides an overview of the academic literature related to the topics of the               
cultural context of rise for RRPPs and the relevance of memory studies. I argue that memory                
studies can help us understand the context in which RRPP thrive.  
 
A. The Radical Right Populist Parties 
RRPPs as defined by Mudde (2007) have three defining features. First, a specific form of               
nationalism (which excludes elitism but includes xenophobia). Second, an opposition to           
fundamental democratic values such as the protection of minorities or the centrality of             
individual rights, that does not violate the democratic state. Third, an ideological base             
consisting of values from the broader radical right (e.g. strong leadership, nativism,            
unemployment, immigration and authoritarianism (Givens, 2005; Frohen, 2006)). These ideas          
will be referred to as RRPP-ideas. 
 
Mudde (2016) identifies three waves of studying RRPPs. First, the rise of these parties              
(1950s-1980s) (Von Beyme, 1988; Betz, 1994). Second, the differences in success           
(1980s-2000s) (Knigge, 1998; Golder, 2003). Third, the effects that these parties have on             
politics and society (2000s-) (Rydgren, 2003). However, as evidenced by the rising number             
of papers on the topic, the explanations for the success of these parties are still a contested                 
area (Mudde, 2016). Different factors contributing to the rise of RRPPs have been identified.              
First, the demand-side which focuses on “the perfect breeding ground” (Mudde, 2007, p. 202)              
and emphasises the importance of voters (Husbands, 2002; Art, 2006). Second, the supply             
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 side which I will develop in more detail below. Third, the internal supply-side which              
emphasises the qualities of the parties themselves (Cole, 2005; Betz, 1998). My research fits              
closest with the work done on supply. 
1) The Supply Side 
The supply side highlights the role of political opportunity structure in the success of RRPPs.               
Mudde (2007) distinguishes three contexts that influence this success: the institutional, the            
political and the cultural. The institutional context emphasises the political and electoral            
structures (plurality, majority or proportional representation) in which parties evolve which           
help or hinder their electoral successes (Hainsworth, 2004; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006).            
Second, the political context adds the dimension of saliency of issues (such as immigration or               
environmental) that some “old” parties may not have adequately taken up which would result              
in the successes of “new” parties (Linz, 1976). 
Finally, the cultural context deals with the “political culture” or the political ​mores​. While              
this context is challenging to measure, it fits into this research by studying the influence of                
cultural factors on the success of RRPPs, which can explain different outcomes in very              
similar systems. A large topic of discussion has been on ‘the new right’ (Mudde, 2007). This                
theory suggests that only a true cultural revolution allows a country to implement             
far-reaching changes such as those offered by RRPPs (De Benoist, 1985). In practice             
however, there are few examples of this happening. Another potential explanation is the             
effect of a certain intellectual climate (Markotich, 2000). While Mudde (2007) discusses            
hostile intellectual climates, I argue that favourable intellectual or cultural contexts play a key              
role. Hostile climates are characterised by the stigmatisation (amongst others) that such            
parties face, which consequently diminish their popularity. Some authors argue that countries            
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 where the Second World war (WWII) and The Holocaust have been “key points of reference               
for the distinction between good and evil” (Mudde, 2007, p. 245), the RRPPs are subject to                
larger amounts of stigmatisation which reduces their influence (Decker, 2003; Klandermans           
and Mayer, 2005). Moreover, it has been argued that RRPPs are more successful in Western               
countries where the collaboration with Germany had been mostly administrative, since they            
can distance themselves from the ideals of nazism (Coffé, Heyndels and Vermeir, 2007).             
Mudde (2007) argues that the relationship between a fascist past and the electoral successes              
of RRPPs is quite convincing, considering that eighteen of thirty-two European countries fit             
this hypothesis (​see ​table 10.1​, ​Ibid., p. 246). This project aims to contribute to our               
understanding of this link, and to thereby address existing theoretical weaknesses. 
 
B. The Politics of Memory 
The field of memory studies covers a large spectrum of perspectives. I employ the              
sociological approach to memory that was first identified by Halbwachs. He defines memory             
and associated frameworks as: “instruments used to reconstruct an image of the past which is               
in accord in each epoch with the predominant thoughts of the society” (Halbwachs, 1980, p.               
39). 
1) Definitions 
Memory is the collection of the images, ideas and representations one has of the past, it                
“establishes life’s continuity, [and] gives meaning to the present as each moment is             
constituted by, and referred to, the past” (Sturken, 1997, p. 1). It can be a coping mechanism                 
for past experiences and a reference for people’s opinions (Thompson and Madigan, 2005).             
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 Consequently, the social approach of memory studies is divided into categories that study             
these different dynamics (Halbwachs, 1980). I am interested in the historical memory, an             
approach that was popularised by Assman (2008) as cultural memory. I will consequently use              
Assmann’s framework defined as: “a collective concept for all knowledge that directs            
behaviour and experience in the interactive framework of a society and one that obtains              
through generations in repeated societal practice and initiation” (​Ibid​., p. 126). 
Cultural memory therefore constitutes a collection of narratives that are created, articulated            
and popularised. He develops six other overlapping characteristics that help us understand            
how cultural memory shapes what is acceptable. These characteristics build on one another in              
the following manner: first, “the concretion of identity” defines storage of knowledge that             
serves to distinguish an in- and out-group. Second, the “capacity to reconstruct” uses this              
identity to (re)construct a common past. Third, “formation” creates a group of common             
narratives and knowledge to be shared within society. Fourth, the “organisation” takes this             
group to arranges and frame them. Fifth, “obligation” dictates the relationship between the             
self-image of an individual and the values of the group. The importance given by the group to                 
certain symbols will influence the representation and reproduction of this self-image. Sixth,            
“reflexivity” refers to the three ways in which cultural memory is ‘reflexive’: a) it is               
practice-reflective, as it interprets common practices through rituals, b) it is self-reflexive as it              
self-referential when explaining certain behaviours, and c) by projecting its own image that             
reflects that of the group, the two are mutually reinforcing. In this research, the cultural               
memory surrounding WWII is analysed as a strong influencer of the value of certain              
(political) ideas. Noticeably, this concept leads to a focus on the bias and selectiveness of               
cultural memory, which distinguishes it from history. This means that, while the historical             
data is important, what ultimately matters is the narrative adopted. I emphasise that, while              
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 talking about cultural memory, the focus remains on the basic political values that arise in               
societies when these reflect on the past. 
2) The Role of Memory 
Many researchers have found memory to be a powerful explanatory tool in various contexts              
(economy: Booth, 1999; migration studies: Fortier, 2000; international relations:         
Langenbacher and Shain, 2010). ​Many political scientists have also discussed memory and            
agreed on its importance (Müller, 2002). However, only a few consider it a substantial factor               
contributing to the rise of RRPPs (Katzenstein, 1997; Berger, 1998; Banchoff, 1999). Indeed,             
the field of memory studies has not been explored as a potential explanatory cause of the rise                 
of RRPPs. I posit that the main reasons for this neglect could relate to the apparent vagueness                 
of the concept; the difficulty of causal claims, and the fact that the subject and approach                
traditionally belong to different academic fields. Indeed, underlying reasons are harder to            
understand and explain, which can limit our insight into their effects. While I agree that a                
causal link between memory of the WWII and the rise of RRPPs is difficult to establish, I                 
will argue that memory has an impact on the social acceptability which can provide a               
(intellectual) favourable context for RRPP-ideas. It therefore contributes to, but does not            
trump, the other explanations.  
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 III/ Theory 
In this section, I make a link between the cultural memory of WWII and the social                
acceptability of RRPP-ideas nowadays. I argue that, while discussing (traumatic) past events,            
political elites actually debate the values and ideas linked to that event.  
 
A. Concepts 
After having discussed ​cultural memory ​in the section above, I will now define the concept of                
social acceptability​. The social acceptability of an idea relates to the extent to which an idea                
is neutrally or positively perceived by voters. It can be seen as a subset of social norms, and a                   
component of the political culture. Social acceptability mainly operates at the level of the              
individual: when confronted with political ideas, individuals use various factors to evaluate            
the relative merit of these ideas. While personal preference or self-interest play an important              
role (Dalton, 2000), social norms, peer-behaviour and institutional factors are also main            
contributors (Clapp and McDonell, 2000). 
Social acceptability relies on different processes. First, at a personal level, individuals use             
their conception of peer norms to judge their own behaviour, and tend to overestimate the               
prevalence of undesirable behaviour in their peers (Prentice and Miller, 1993). Second, at a              
group level, the sources of the perceptions of social acceptability may be reinforced amongst              
individuals: by sharing education, being raised in similar cultures, or member of the same              
political party (​Ibid.​). Third, at a cultural level, those norms of behaviour are reinforced by               
normative injunctions (i.e. what is commonly approved in the culture) (Reno, Cialdini, and             
Kallgren, 1993). 
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 B. Theoretical Argument 
My theoretical argument can be summarised as follows: governments portray a certain image 
of WWII in the present that affects the social acceptability of ideas that RRPPs try to appeal 
to, thereby influencing their political success.  
 
Cultural memory influences social acceptability in the following ways. After WWII,           
European countries were faced with destruction and leaders believed the unity of the people              
needed to be restored (Lebow, 2006). Within a general trend of amnesia, most of the               
politicians, intellectuals and citizens constructed and accepted myths about their (positive)           
role during the war (Art, 2006). The narrative is primarily (but not exclusively) picked and               
diffused by the government (​Ibid​.), and is reproduced through cultural artefacts (Thomson            
and Madigan, 2005). It follows that how and whether ideas are enshrined in cultural memory               
influences their social acceptability, since the way a country deals with its past creates a set of                 
ideas and normative judgments. The memory of WWII became a frame of reference to which               
political actors look for justification or critique of RRPP-ideas. In some countries, these ideas              
were not exposed as inherently wrong and were therefore enshrined as “acceptable” or left              
unaddressed in the cultural memory (Lebow, 2006). The manipulation of the past creates the              
illusion that the population is resistant to the specific ideas, thereby decreasing their             
opposition. The references to WWII nowadays convey the lessons learned from this period             
and reiterate the position of a country towards those ideas. As such, the way in which WWII                 
is remembered today strengthens or weakens the appeal of those ideas.  
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 In turn, social acceptability influences the success of RRPPs in six ways. The three first first                
at a societal level and three at a political level. First, true supporters of RRPPs may now more                  
easily engage in additional activities or talk about their beliefs due to the reduced              
stigmatisation (Betz, 1994). Second, the increase in acceptability may also bring in support             
from individuals who might previously consider the RRPP-ideas to be undesirable           
(Klandermans and Mayer, 2005). Third, some individuals want to vote for RRPP due to their               
non-radical policy-positions, but refrain due to the presence of the radical positions, an             
increased social acceptability influences this (Van Donselaar, 2003). Fourth, the increased           
acceptability of ideas forces political opponents to change strategies to oppose these views             
(​Ibid.​). Fifth, due to a general increase in acceptability, a group of fierce political opponents               
will take this as an incentive to double down in their opposition towards the ideas (Meguid,                
2008). Finally, this increased acceptability may lead other political parties to consider joining             
coalition governments with RRPPs to further their political interests, without fearing backlash            
from their own voters (​Ibid.​).  
 
On the basis of my theory, I expect that the less negative the memory of WWII, the less                  
critically it treats certain political ideas, thereby increasing their social acceptability. This            
would mean that nations with an “uncritical” cultural memory would be more likely to see               
RRPPs success, holding other factors constant. Moreover, considering the above, I expect to             
find that the mainstream parties will conform to the post-war narratives in their discourse,              
while the RRPPs will try to change and influence the narrative in order to bend the social                 
acceptability.  
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 IV/ Research Design 
My research can be characterised as a dual-case comparative qualitative study as it allows              
in-depth analysis and the necessary proximity to the data under study (Mudde, 2007).  
A. Case Selection 
I analyse two cases: Germany and Italy. In order to select these cases, I examined Western                
European countries and removed those under the former influence of the USSR, since the              
totalitarian nature and subsequent collapse of these regimes provides us with fundamentally            
different cultural memory (Lebow, 2006). Subsequently, I selected allied countries during the            
war; the alternative providing too great a counter variable. To reduce more common counter              
variables (Lagrou, 2003; Art, 2006; Lebow, 2006), I also ensure that the two final cases are                
picked on a most similar system design. As summarised in table 1, Germany and Italy formed                
the only proper pair where the IV and DV show the relationship I theorise, with all other                 
factors holding constant. In addition, Germany and Italy share a number of features: first,              
their dictatorships ended at similar points in time. Second, their governments collaborated            
closely during WWII. Third, their authoritarian regime came from within the country (unlike             
Austria that was considered as a case). 
 Outcome 
of war 
(Im) 
peninent 
Fascist 
past 
Multi- 
party System  
Saliency of 
Nativist issues  
Historical 
Resistance 
France 
 
Germany 
 
Italy 
 
Netherlands 
 
Austria 
Winning 
 
Losing 
 
Losing 
 
Winning 
 
Losing 
Impenitent 
 
Penitent 
 
Impenitent 
 
Impenitent 
 
Impenitent 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Small 
 
Small 
 
Small 
 
Small 
 
Small 
Table 1: Case Selection 
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Before continuing, I will clarify the concept of ‘(im)penitence’. It goes without saying that              
any relationship a nation has towards its WWII past is complex and nuanced. However, by               
looking at two factors in particular, I can identify categorical differences between the way in               
countries handled their (cultural) memory of WWII. First, the extent to which the narrative              
portrays the majority of the nation as essentially being in a state of resistance towards an                
oppressor (also in light of historical evidence) and second, the recognition of a (negative) role               
of the country or an admittance of guilt. The concept therefore refers to the extent to which                 
Italy and Germany portray their resistance and to what extent they accept the blame. I will                
develop both cases in the first part of my results section. 
 
B. Operationalisation 
In order to perform my analysis, I use academic work to identify the main post-war narrative                
adopted by Germany and Italy. I then analyse the influence of post-war narratives employed 
in political speeches (independent variable) onto public opinion (dependent variable). The           
analysis of political speeches serves two goals. First, to see how the memory of WWII is                
represented and used by political actors; and second to investigate which type of party uses               
which approach to memory to see how mainstream these ideas are. I analyse (written)              
statements by political elites that a) link past events to current political norms (Art, 2006)               
and/or b) strategically look to influence the cultural memory on WWII (Rothstein, 2000).             
Step A shows how references to this period are used to influence the public. Step B helps us                  
analyse to what extent politicians are forced to adapt their narrative to the cultural memory of                
the war and/or to what extent they can manipulate it. In order to understand the relationship                
between memory and valuation, I look at speeches given by politicians from mainstream             
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 parties and RRPPs. The analysis of opinion polls serves two goals: first, to see how the                
population positions itself regarding the issues related to WWII; and second to investigate             
trends noticed in the academic work and speeches to see if they are reflected. 
As mentioned, I will look particularly at the social acceptability of RRPP-ideas that are              
linked to WWII memory (strong leadership, nativist issues, nationalism, anti- immigration,           
unemployment and anti-EU sentiment (Givens, 2005; Art, 2006; Lebow, 2006)). These topics            
are the specific components of RRPP-ideas that are linked to the salient topics of the WWII.                
Indeed, the first three are at the core of fascism and nazism and are main components of                 
contemporary radical right parties. The next three are a core of populist movements claiming              
that unemployment is the result of globalist, capitalist forces and helps divide between ‘the              
own people’ and outsiders which combines with the type of nationalism that was popular in               
WWII. Finally, while the EU is not directly part of WWII’s discourses, the organisation does               
influence the rate of immigration and unemployment, and is framed as being part of these               
so-called elites; thus directly relating it to the sentiments present in WWII.  
The work of Paxton (1998) helps us further identify markers of fascism that I look for in the                  
speeches and the opinion polls; “1. The primacy of the group, toward which one has duties                
superior to every right, whether universal or individual. 2. The belief that one’s group is a                
victim, a sentiment which justifies any action against the group’s enemies, internal as well as               
external. 3. Dread of the group’s decadence under the corrosive effect of individualistic and              
cosmopolitan liberalism” (​Ibid., ​p. 6-7).  
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 C. Data Selection 
1) Political Speeches 
For each country, ten speeches are selected and the analysis is grouped in two topics of                
analysis: 1) the memory of the Second World war; and 2) the ideal relationship to the broader                 
community. The speeches have been selected on the basis of availability and their relevance              
to this topic (e.g. commemoration days; speeches about the EU). I selected speeches from the               
last four years to ensure continuity in the governments that gave them. Where the context or                
occasion for a speech is particularly relevant, (e.g. after a meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu,              
current Prime Minister of Israel), a speech might be less recent.  
For Germany, the speeches selected for the mainstream were given by ​Bundeskanzlerin            
Angela Merkel, as she has spoken most extensively on the subject and as the representative of                
her government for the last thirteen years. For the RRPPs, the speeches were given by               
different members of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party for the sake of             
representativeness. For Italy, the qualification is somewhat different. Indeed, some radical           
parties such as Forza Italia have already been in government and some more radical populist               
parties such as Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5*) are seen as mainstream. As such I will look                
at the equivalent of mainstream for Germany and call it moderate and the equivalent of               
RRPPs and call it radical. The speeches from the moderate parties are those given by Italian                
Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni and Italian President Sergio Mattarella, as together they            
represent the current moderate government. For the radical, several political movements in            
Italy appeal to voters through RRPP-ideas: Lega Nord, Forza Italia and, to some extent, M5*.               
Indeed, M5* is not directly considered radical, but a number of their political stances such as                
on immigration law, anti-EU sentiment or nationalistic policies (M5*, 2018) belong in this             
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 category. This may support my argument by showing that a party with RRPP-ideas can be               
seen as mainstream.  
2) Opinion Polls 
When possible, the polls that were applied to both Germany and Italy were selected to ensure                
that the concepts were measured in the same way and that other variables held constant as                
much as possible. When this type data was not available, I paid special attention to the                
formulation of the question to reduce bias in the answers. The analysis of the polls focuses on                 
the topics at stake: 1) position on strong leadership; 2) immigration and xenophobia; and 3)               
the perception of the EU. 
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 V/ Results 
 
This section will analyse the impact of the messages in political speeches onto public opinion               
to examine the link between contemporary memory of WWII and the social acceptability of              
the values associated with it. The context for this dynamic is provided by looking at academic                
work.  
 
A. Academic Work 
1) Italy 
During WWII, Mussolini’s desire to gather the Italian people under his leadership led him to               
develop an image of Italians as “good people” or “Brava Gente” (Favero, 2010). After the               
war, events that took place during the war were reshaped in order to make the fascist crimes                 
look small compared to those of the Nazis and the resistance was glorified and amplified               
(​Oliva, 2006). ​The myth of “Brava Gente” gained in popularity and, according to this              
narrative, Italy came out of the war victorious (Lagrou, 2003). Fascist Italy was set to be                
remembered as an unfortunate parenthesis in history ​(Curigliano, Mininni and Leone, 2003;            
Lebow, 2006)​. This disassociation with guilt is representative of what the literature identified             
as a context that can be conducive to RRPPs. It also corresponds to the second point of                 
Paxton (1998) about self-victimisation. Nowadays, this myth of “good people” has served as             
an excuse for several events, such as attacks on migrants, the participation in the War on                
Terror and the reemergence of fascist ideas in the public sphere (Favero, 2010). According to               
this narrative, as Italians are fundamentally good people with good intentions, their actions             
are justifiable: they do not mean any wrong and must have an alternative reason to perpetuate                
18 
 these crimes (​Ibid.​). This notion holds particular significance for this study, because it entails              
that the ​fascism of the past is not considered a danger anymore (Del Boca, 2005; Favero,                
2010).  
2) Germany  
In contrast, Germany has acknowledged the role it has played in the war and has not created a                  
myth of resistance as their post-war narrative (Lebow, 2006). A mix of lived experiences,              
memories, repressions, official historiography and narratives emerged as conflicting accounts          
into Germany and the world. This process forced the country into greater exposure of its past,                
until all involved were satisfied that no stone had been left unturned (Hartman, 1986).              
Germany represents one of the only cases where the international community was involved in              
setting its post-war narrative. They were, and to some extent, still are, weighed down by               
collective shame, and the feeling to have to pay for what happened (Dresler-Hawke and Liu,               
2006). For example, the “culture of welcoming” towards (non-European) refugees is           
considered by the media to be part of this repayment (Bennhold, 2015). This shame has also                
been found to correlate with a lower attachment to the national unit which results in reduced                
nationalism (Dresler-Hawke and Liu, 2006). This has also led many Germans to seek a higher               
(European) or lower (regional) level of identification, in order to deny culpability through             
history or by claiming a family’s history of resistance (​Ibid.). 
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 B. Political Speeches 
This section analyses the political speeches on the basis of two topics. The memory of the                
second world war is identified as a triple approach. The second topic, the relation to the                
broader community, is mainly represented in reference to the European Union. 
1) The Memory of the Second World War 
A triple approach to the relationship of both countries to their past is used to display the                 
trends set by political elites towards their WWII memory. First, the extent to which WWII is                
the point of reference for the worst possible (political) outcomes. Second, the importance of              
remembrance and careful reflection on the past. Third, the notion of ownership and             
responsibility. I will begin by analysing the moderate parties in Germany and Italy will be               
examined, and then compare them the radical parties. 
 
Germany brings up WWII as the example of the worst possible outcomes, including in              
contexts where it is not directly relevant. This is exemplified when looking at the speech               
given by Merkel at the World Economic Forum when she refers to “the return of the failures                 
of the twentieth century, in any form” as the worst possible outcomes of current changing               
economic and political trends (Merkel, 2018a). This idea is strengthened in her speech in              
front of the Israeli Knesset (2008) which devotes much attention to the fault and shame of the                 
Germans for the acts ‘they’ committed. Moreover, Merkel (2008) argues that Germany has             
not done enough: “(...) it took more than forty years before Germany as a whole               
acknowledged and embraced both its historical responsibility and the State of Israel”. While             
the subject and amount of time dedicated to it make sense in the context of the speech (the                  
20 
 German head of state in front of the Israeli Parliament); the gravity and relevance of the                
subject are core of the German (political) identity. 
The second part is the importance of remembering and carefully reflecting on WWII. At a               
commemoration event in the former concentration camp of Dachau, Merkel (2015a)           
explained that memory must constantly be recalled because what happened during WWII            
“exceeds imagination, particularly of young people”. She made a similar point during the             
Roosevelt address (Merkel, 2016), stating that the destruction of Middelburg was ​“hardly            
imaginable” (as the landscape showed no trace of it), therefore needing to be remembered.              
Apart from serving as a political point of reference, commemoration is seen as the basis of                
fundamental values and shared understanding between people. These references by Merkel           
create the idea that Germany absolutely needs its memory to face ​‘​the current challenges​’​.  
The final part is the importance of guilt: in most speeches, ‘Germany’, as opposed to the                
‘nazi-regime’ is identified as the culprit. In her speech before the Knesset, Merkel (2008)              
made the construction of a better world conditional upon Germany accepting its role in              
WWII: “I most firmly believe that only if Germany accepts its enduring responsibility for the               
moral disaster in its history will we be able to build a humane future. Or, to put it another                   
way, respect for our common humanity is rooted in our responsibility for the past”. The               
importance of Germany accepting responsibility is particularly emphasised in the context of            
discussions on the German youth: during her Dachau address, Merkel (2015a) used the             
metaphor of the pied piper of Hamelin to express her fears about what might happen if the                 
youth did not realise the dangers arising from RRPP-ideas. This was reinforced by Tauber              
who expressed that “we need to raise the youth awareness so that they can spot racism and                 
totalitarianism from the very beginning” (Merkel, 2015b). This statement emphasises the           
need for training on spotting radical ideas mentioned earlier.  
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On the other hand, Italy has a different approach to WWII. The war is generally not                
represented as the worst possible outcome, but instead more as a lesson learned. The analysis               
of speeches show that WWII is only mentioned when directly relevant (e.g. commemoration             
days). While Merkel (2018b) brought up the example explicitly during her speech at the              
World Economic Forum, Gentiloni (2018) did not mention anything about WWII. Moreover,            
on a topic as relevant as the EU, during the state of the union in 2018, Mattarella (2018a)                  
only referred to the importance of remembering both world wars to highlight the importance              
of the European model, with no special attention given to WWII.  
Second, the importance of commemoration is also discussed regularly, particularly in the            
context of anniversaries or when appealing to the long arc of European history. However,              
vastly different approaches can be observed to those that characterise mainstream German            
politics. During the ceremony marking the 73rd anniversary of the liberation, Mattarella            
(2018b) stated that the Italian people had “(...) an innate recognition of the common              
belonging to mankind, which also constituted the absolute rejection of any ideology based on              
oppression, violence and racial superiority”. Moreover, this corroborates the previously stated           
notion that Italian people are said to be “trained” to pick up on extremist ideas, which they do                  
not see in RRPPs and therefore do not fear to vote for them. This corresponds to the notion                  
that individuals in countries with an impenitent cultural memory, are less sensitive toward the              
possible resurfacing of WWII ideas in RRPP. Furthermore, this echoes the point that when              
collaboration with the regime is only seen as administrative, this creates a more conducive              
environment for RRPP. As such, in their commemorations, Italy emphasises its automatic            
ability to fight totalitarianism and underlines former resistance, whereas Germany reinforces           
the need for cooperation and constant reflection as a means to avoid previous catastrophes. 
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 Third, the moderate Italian parties refer to the country’s role in the war in different terms than                 
their German counterparts. For instance, Mattarella (2018b) consistently refers to the           
‘problem’ coming from “nazi-fascism” instead of from within Italy itself, thereby portraying            
the Italians as victims rather than perpetrators, which is a marker of fascism according to               
Paxton (1988). Tellingly, he refers to the soldiers of Mussolini as German (Mattarella 2018b).              
During the 71st anniversary of the liberation, Mattarella (2016b) stated that: “The Italian             
people as a whole knew how to react to barbarism”. This again shows how the Italian’s                
moderate approach places much less blame on the country than the German mainstream             
approach. The myth of “Brava Gente” is still very much alive: the country as a whole was                 
resistant. In another speech given to editors of Micromega magazine, Mattarella (2015)            
argued that the resistance, before taking political form can be understood as a moral revolt,               
passed down from “father to son” and which must always remain part of the collective               
memory. This is in stark contrast to the speech given by Merkel (2008), in which she stated                 
that Germany had eventually rightly accepted the blame (and the shame) for the crimes              
committed. Finally, Mattarella (2016a), also urged everyone to commemorate the fate of the             
Jewish population, citing the example of a 1943 raid on the Roman jews in a speech given                 
after a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. However, he stated that the Shoah is a                
constitutive element for many nations, including Italy, but not particularly Italy, even though             
the country had a considerable role in the deportation. 
 
In Germany, the RRPPs have a very different approach to WWII than the mainstream. For               
instance, the question of whether Germany fulfilled its obligation is a topic of contention as               
the AfD (Gauland, 2017) states that “no other people have dealt as clearly with their past                
wrongs as the Germans”, thereby implying that they had done enough. Moreover, Gauland             
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 (2017) contends that Germans should have the right to be proud of their military              
achievements during the World Wars. The AfD stated that the current way in which Germany               
commemorates its past is a crippling approach that benefits the political establishment (​Ibid. ​).             
Furthermore, he criticises that by only acknowledging the German perpetrators, we forgot the             
German victims (​Ibid.​). This is a clear example of a political actor trying to influence the                
cultural memory to achieve a certain political goal. In particular, it echoes the second and               
third point of Paxton (1998), by portraying Germany as a victim to its mainstream politics               
and European elites due to placing disproportionate blame on Germany.  
For Italy, the radical parties barely mention WWII. For example, when asked about it during               
an interview, Salvini (2018), remained vague and stated that fascism had also done a “lot of                
good things”, but that the persecution of the Jewish population was “crazy”. Di Maio (2018)               
stated that he did not want to get into the subject when asked to comment on the statement by                   
Salvini. Finally, Berlusconi (2013) praised Mussolini by stating that the ‘anti-semitic race            
laws’ were the only real blemish on an otherwise good record. 
The marked difference in statements and speeches on the example of WWII and the role of                
commemoration between the Italian and German RRPPs are worth reflecting on. It is possible              
that in Italy, due to the moderate parties approach being somewhat similar to the one               
expected from the radical parties, the radical parties do not have to worry about defending               
their positions, as it is much less used as an argument to criticise them than in the German                  
context. It may also be possible that, due to the way in which the Italian government has                 
created the cultural memory, the majority of Italians simply do not see the link between               
RRPP-ideas and the example of WWII. This would also why the M5*, which appeal to many                
radical ideas, is seen by many Italians as a mainstream party. Another explanation could be               
that this event is much more salient is everyday politics in Germany and as such more present                 
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 in the minds of politicians and the population, who are thus more likely to bring it up.                 
Accordingly, this lends support to my theoretical argument, where such a difference on the              
treatment of the memory was expected.  
2) The Relationship to the Broader Community 
Germany’s mainstream approach to cooperation both in Europe and globally is that their             
futures are intrexibly linked. In fact, Merkel (2018b) refers to the German motto for the G7                
(“shaping an interconnected world”) as one that is appropriate for the world while facing the               
current challenges. In speeches Merkel constantly refers to “our” values, history, and “us             
Europeans”. This is done to such an extent that these statements become affirmations: “the              
cooperation of tomorrow will work”. Merkel (2018b) only addresses the challenges raised by             
the process of globalisation by emphasising the benefits which globalisation brings.  
In Italy, the moderate parties also emphasise the importance of European cooperation. They             
see the EU as a pragmatic solution to address many challenges, and justify its legitimacy in                
terms of shared history and values (Gentiloni, 2018). However, Italian political elites are             
quicker to emphasise the need to protect their nation and interests than the German              
mainstream is (Mattarella, 2018a). Moreover, from the statements analysed, it becomes clear            
that Italian moderate politicians emphasise Italy’s own role in and contributions to the union.              
As an example, Mattarella (2018a) emphasises how proud Italy is to host the European              
University Institute. Gentiloni, when discussing the subject of migration at the World            
Economic Forum (2018), stated that “Italy saves lives at sea, even if it is costly” and praised                 
how Italy had managed to curb migration without external assistance. This shows to some              
extent the glorification of one nation over others (strong nationalism), and the (possible)             
legitimation of the protection of such a nation (Paxton’s (1998) first point) .  
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The AfD argues the opposite position from Merkel. Weidel (2018) of the AfD stated at the                
parliament that more Europe meant more money and diluted sovereignty at the expense of the               
German people. In the view of the AfD, Brussels is attempting to extract crucially needed               
funding from the German people, in order to continue the callous overpaying of their own               
bureaucrats, who, according to the AfD, lack democratic legitimacy. This approach to            
international cooperation also reflects Paxton’s (1998) first point on the primacy of one             
group, the feeling of victimhood and the decadence of the group under cosmopolitanism. 
In Italy, the position of radical parties on the EU is similarly profoundly negative. The M5*                
and Lega Nord are strongly against the European Union, with Forza Italia expressing less              
forceful, yet still critical positions. It should be noted that the precise reasons for the               
opposition varies between the parties: M5* identifies as an alter-globalist movement with            
strong support for direct democracy, which is incompatible with the bureaucracy of the             
European Union (M5*, 2018). On the other hand, Lega Nord opposes the EU on the grounds                
that they wish to maximise their own control over political power and resources. In both               
cases, the parties distance the need for cooperation and reinforce the supremacy of the group;               
both markers of fascism according to Paxton (1998). 
 
C. Opinion Polls 
1) Strong Leadership and Authoritarianism 
The notion of the need for a strong leader is a key component of both Nazism and Fascism,                  
and RRPPs commonly appeal to this value. The main results are summarised in chart 1. We                
see a large disparity between the acceptability of key values associated with RRPP-ideas..             
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 Especially the lack of interference in decision-making is five times more acceptable to             
Italians than to Germans. In Italy, despite the fact that the majority still clearly rejects both                
fascism and the example of Mussolini, up to a super-minority of 40% sees fascism as an idea                 
that can be communicated or supported (Termometro Politico, 2018). Overall, it can be seen              
that Germany is more resistant to RRPP-ideas than Italy, a trend that is also apparent in the                 
speeches and academic work, since the German mainstream and the narrative make a point of               
rejecting and exposing these ideas. 
 
 2) Immigration and Xenophobia 
Given the common values of (ultra)nationalism and nativism found in RRPPs and the             
constant attention the topic is given in the speeches, the topic looks at immigration. The most                
important results are summarised in charts two and three. Overall, Italians are much more              
afraid of migrants and immigration than the Germans. In fact, Germans identify social             
inequality as their main fear, whereas Italians refer to immigration (Tagesschau, 2017). This             
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 result could suggest that the German identity is still profoundly affected by the example of               
racial and social segregation during WWII. It also emphasises the trends identified in             
academic work and political speeches: Italy is seen more as a nation to protect and take pride                 
in, making it inaccessible to foreigners, while Germany is open and welcoming. In fact, only               
6% of the Italians polled believe that immigration is an opportunity, a noticeable difference              
with the Germans (38%). However, these differences can lie in the origin of the migration, its                
qualitative difference, the extent to which there is already a community of the group present               
in the country and what infrastructure a country has available to process incoming migrants.              
The Eurobarometer (2017b) disentangles the relationships between the variables to some           
extent. The greatest differences between Italy and Germany are on whether immigration            
enriches cultural life (45% favour Italy v. 69% favour Germany); whether they are a burden               
on the welfare system (63% favour Italy v. 71% favour Germany); and the largest difference               
on whether immigration takes jobs away from the country (58% favour Italy v. 21% favour               
Germany). In addition, the views on the necessity of acquiring nationality is considered part              
of a successful integration show a striking nationalism (69% of Italians agree, against 52% of               
Germans). Overall, the opinion polls show that the level of nationalism in Italy is higher and                
exerts influence over people’s views on immigration as noticed in the academic work and              
speeches. 
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 3) Perception of the European Union 
This section covers the national perceptions of the European Union. The main results are              
presented in charts four and five (Eurobarometer, 2017a). The Germans are vastly more             
supportive of the EU on specific points (such as trust, and feeling of EU citizenship). This                
clearly reflects the trends found in the political speeches, during which Germany expressed             
greater support for the European Union and the necessity for EU-cooperation. The more held              
back approach in the Italian speeches can also be witnessed here, with the majority of Italians                
not expressing overtly negative sentiments but clearly having a more reserved position.            
Interestingly, when asked about the image of the EU, both countries are close to one another.                
Secondly, both nations identify freedom of movement as one of the most positive things to               
come out of the EU (Italy 51%; Germany 61%), but Germany attributes peace as a result of                 
the EU at 72%. Meanwhile, only 36% of Italians expressed a similar sentiment. Both              
countries deviate substantially in both directions from the EU-average (56%). This reflects            
the ongoing preoccupation in German society with WWII leading to a high preference for              
continental peace and the changes that the EU has brought in that regard. Interestingly, polled               
citizens from both countries identify terrorism and immigration as the most important issues             
facing the EU, which are also issues that RRPPs appeal to. In this case, it is not possible to                   
assess whether it being the main challenge should be understood as a criticism of the EU                
(which would be in line with RRPPs) or as something that respondents believe the EU is in                 
the process of addressing. Moreover, during the last Eurobarometer (2017a), it became clear             
that Italians are losing trust in the EU, and at a faster rate than the European average . Finally,                  1
the Italians polled did not feel like EU citizens, reflecting the high levels of nationalism as                
1 ​Compared to the previous barometer, 34% now trust the EU (down 2 percentage points); 52% do not trust (up 
4 percentage points) and 14% do not know (down 2 percentage points). 
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 opposed to the Germans, 82% of who identified as European. This overwhelmingly supports             
the academic theory that Germans prefer to identify with a higher or lower identity.  
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 VI/ Conclusion and Implications 
This thesis has explored the relationship between the cultural memory of Second World war              
and the social acceptability of radical right populist party-ideas by investigating: ​to what             
extent and in what way(s) does the manner in which the Second World War is remembered in                 
countries influence the social acceptability of ideas linked to radical right-wing populist            
parties? ​. It has provided an overview of literature on the factors that influence the success of                
radical right populist parties and on the added value of memory studies. It then presented an                
argument on how to integrate memory studies into radical right populist party studies through              
the intervening step of social acceptability. Subsequently, through the examination of           
academic, political- and polling-sources, it was possible to research the difference in the             
effect that the memory of the Second World war has in Italy and Germany. The analysis was                 
guided by two main expectations. First, that the less critical the memory of the Second World                
war, the less critical it treats certain political ideas, thereby increasing their social             
acceptability. Second, that the mainstream parties conform to the post-war narrative(s) in            
their discourse while radical right populist parties try to change and influence the narrative.              
Through an in-depth analysis of two countries, the first expectation was fully supported by              
the evidence. The second expectation was only partially supported.  
A number of findings are worth emphasising. First, all three sources supported the theoretical              
argument. The academic work emphasised that the memory of the role of countries in the               
Second World war constitutes a major pillar in the construction of both the German and               
Italian identities. Second, the political speeches showed that the mainstream parties abide by             
the narrative. Interestingly, while the German radical right populist party contested the            
mainstream narrative (as was expected in the theory), the Italian radical parties hardly             
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 commented on it. Three reasons for this were presented: moderate parties already do not              
provide a critical perspective on the example; voters do not see the link between the ideas of                 
the Second World war and those presented by radical right populist parties; and the topic is                
much more salient in Germany than in Italy. Furthermore, a positive relationship was             
established between the criticality of the memory and support for the European Union.             
Finally, in the opinion polls, the trends highlighted in academic work and political speeches              
were convincingly reinforced.  
A number of limitations are worth mentioning. First, the concept of memory remains             
relatively vague compared to certain other concepts in political science, which can make it              
difficult to make strong claims about its effects. Memory is also deeply intertwined with              
language which is more subtle to analyse. In this case, due to the use of translations of                 
speeches and poll questions, some subtleties may escape the observer. Secondly, cultural            
memory is often referred to implicitly as a common knowledge. This makes research             
challenging for researchers that lack a direct relationship with the culture. Generally, radical             
right populist parties are a complex subject of study with many possible factors of              
explanation which could limit the comparative power of this theory.  
Given the implications of the influence of memory on social acceptability, several avenues             
for future research should be mentioned. First, while this study has shown the promise of the                
fields interacting, more future work is needed to investigate possible overlap between the             
fields. By examining similarities in the subjects and theory, insights from both fields can be               
further combined. Second, It is equally important to establish where and how the fields are               
incompatible, as failure to do so this may lead to inconsistent or even incoherent theoretical               
frameworks. In order to facilitate this consolidation, in-depth qualitative work on relatively            
small groups and on topics of limited size is recommended. Examples of such research may               
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 take the general analysis of this thesis and then apply it to a particular region, radical right                 
populist party or election. Third, research into different periods in the past can show how a                
difference in the narratives at the time influence(d) the social acceptability of radical right              
populist party-ideas at that time. Fourth, large-n work that seeks to establish to what extent               
the argument is generally supported will indicate the most interesting cases for future             
research. As such, political scientists should search for those factors which are held in              
common, but not explicitly shared between individuals. The national post-war narratives,           
with their strong reinforcement through education, social norms and references by political            
actors, should therefore be treated as one of the potential, and possibly overlooked,             
influencers of social acceptability. 
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